We investigate cost-sharing mechanisms for scheduling cost-sharing games. We assume that the demand is general-that is, each player can be allocated one of several levels of service.
Introduction
In a general demand cost-sharing game, there is a set of customers who is interested in receiving service from a service provider. The customers' demand for service is general -that is, each customer can receive various levels of service. Each customer has its own private valuation for the various levels of service. In order to determine which customers to serve, the service provider solicits bids from each customer. Based on these bids and the cost of providing service, the service provider determines the level of service it provides each customer, and how the cost of providing this service is shared by the customers-in other words, how much each customer has to pay. The algorithm that the service provider uses to determine these quantities is called a cost-sharing mechanism. * Amazon.com, 2201 Westlake Ave, Seattle, WA 98121, USA. e-mail: ramaba@amazon.com † Corresponding author. School of Industrial Engineering, Purdue University, Grissom Hall 308, West Lafayette, IN 47904, USA. phone: +1 765-496-7241, fax: +1 765-494-1299, e-mail: nuhan@purdue.edu To illustrate, consider the following example, based on a scheduling problem. In this setting, there is a set of customers, each of which has a number of identical jobs it would like to be processed on a single machine. This machine is maintained by a service provider. Here, the level of service that a customer receives corresponds to the number of its jobs processed on the machine. The service provider solicits bids from the customers, and based on these bids and the processing costs, determines how many of each customer's jobs to process, and the price to charge each customer for processing its jobs.
There has been considerable work on cost-sharing mechanisms, focusing on designing mechanisms with various desirable properties, such as: (i) truthfulness, the idea that it is optimal for each customer to bid its private valuation, (ii) budget-balance, the notion that the service provider recovers the cost of providing the service, and (iii) efficiency, the idea that the total social welfare of the customers is maximized. Most of the work so far has been on binary demand cost-sharing gamesthat is, when customers either receive one level of service or none at all. For this case, Moulin (1999) and Moulin and Shenker (2001) proposed a class of cost-sharing mechanisms, known as Moulin mechanisms, and showed that these mechanisms achieve a notion of truthfulness known as group strategyproofness. Several researchers have studied the design of approximately budget-balanced Moulin mechanisms for a variety of cost-sharing games, such as those arising from network design (e.g. Jain and Vazirani 2001; Archer et al. 2004; Gupta et al. 2007a,b; Roughgarden and Sundararajan 2007) , facility location (e.g. Pál and Tardos 2003; Leonardi and Schäfer 2004; Könemann et al. 2005; Immorlica et al. 2008) , and logistics (e.g. Xu and Yang 2009) . Motivated by impossibility results on the existence of simultaneously truthful, budget-balanced, and efficient mechanisms (Green et al. 1976; Roberts 1979) , developed an alternate framework to quantify efficiency in cost-sharing mechanisms. Mehta et al. (2009) proposed a generalization of Moulin mechanisms, called acyclic mechanisms, and showed that they achieve a weaker notion of truthfulness known as weak group strategyproofness for cost-sharing games with binary demand, as well as for those with general demand. Brenner and Schäfer (2008b) developed a framework for obtaining approximately budget-balanced and approximately efficient acyclic mechanisms for binary demand cost-sharing games. Brenner and Schäfer (2010) studied cost-sharing mechanisms in an online setting, in which players arrive over time and reveal their characteristics only at the time of arrival.
One type of cost-sharing game that has received a fair amount of attention is the kind that arises from scheduling problems. Like in the illustrative example described above, in a general demand scheduling cost-sharing game, each customer has a number of jobs that it would like to be processed by a set of machines, maintained by a service provider. Each customer requires that its jobs must be processed in a certain order, and the service level that a customer receives corresponds to the number of its jobs that are processed. The service provider's cost of processing these jobs is given by the optimal value of an associated scheduling problem (e.g., the minimum sum of weighted completion times). Brenner and Schäfer (2008a) and Bleischwitz and Monien (2009) In this work, we study how to design cost-sharing mechanisms for general demand cost-sharing games. We extend the framework of Brenner and Schäfer (2008b) and show how to use an approximation algorithm for the service provider's underlying optimization problem to obtain an acyclic mechanism that is approximately budget-balanced and approximately efficient (Theorems 3.1 and 3.2). Then, we give acyclic mechanisms for general demand cost-sharing games that arise from a variety of scheduling problems with concave regular sum objectives. This class of objective functions includes the classic total weighted completion time objective. We consider scheduling cost-sharing games in single machine (Theorem 4.3), identical parallel machine (Theorem 4.7) , and concurrent open shop environments (Theorem 4.11). We accomplish this by using the framework with a list scheduling algorithm-an algorithm that schedules according to a permutation of the jobs-for each of the underlying scheduling problems. The budget-balance and efficiency guarantees dictated by the framework hold for these mechanisms, as long as the list scheduling algorithm used is compatible with the customers' service levels: that is, as long as the customers require their jobs be processed in the same order as the list scheduling algorithm.
2 Preliminaries on general demand cost-sharing games
In this section, we give a brief introduction to general demand cost-sharing games and cost-sharing mechanisms as studied and presented by Mehta et al. (2009) .
Consider a setting with a service provider and a universe U = {1, 2, . . . , n} of players. Every player i ∈ U is interested in a set of services {1, 2, . . . , R i } where R i is the publicly known maximum service level of player i. These services are ordered so that player i has to obtain all the services {1, 2, . . . , j − 1} before obtaining service j. Hence, the set of services can also be thought of as levels of service. For the sake of compactness, if player i is served service levels {1, 2, . . . , s i } for some 0 ≤ s i ≤ R i , we say s i is the service level of player i.
≥0 describes the level of service offered, or allocated, to each player: in allocation S, s i is the service level allocated to player i ∈ U . The minimal allocation is ∅ = (0, 0, . . . , 0) and the maximal allocation is R max = (R 1 , R 2 , . . . , R n ). Alternatively, an allocation S = (s 1 , s 2 , . . . , s n ) can be viewed as a closed set of (player, service level) pairs
In this work, we use both notions of an allocation interchangeably.
We denote the set of all allocations by A.
A cost function c : A → R describes the cost of providing service: c(S) is the cost of providing the service levels in allocation S. By assumption, c(∅) = 0, and c(S) is nondecreasing in every component of S. In this work, we assume that the cost c(S) for an allocation S is the value of a minimum-cost solution to an underlying optimization problem that models the service provider's problem of providing S.
Each player i ∈ U has a private type
is player i's marginal valuation of service level j; that is, the amount player i is willing to pay for service level j after receiving service levels 1, 2, . . . , j − 1. By assumption, v i (j) is nonincreasing in j. Player i's total valuation for service level j is
The value b i (j) is player i's announced marginal bid for service level j, that is, the amount player i announces it is willing to pay for service level j after receiving service levels 1, 2, . . . , j − 1. Player i's total bid for service level j is j k=1 b i (k). By assumption, b i (j) is also nonincreasing in j.
1 A set P of pairs of positive integers is closed if (i, j) ∈ P implies (i, j − 1) ∈ P .
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Before we move on, a note about the assumptions made here. Note we assume that v i (j) is nonincreasing in j for any player i ∈ U ; in other words, each player derives nonincreasing marginal value for each additional level of service it obtains. This is the common "diminishing marginal utility" assumption in economics. This assumption is reasonable in many contexts. For example, consider a general demand cost-sharing game in which the service levels correspond to the number of connections made between a player and a server. In this case, the first connection is arguably the most important and valued most highly, while the subsequent connections are useful but redundant, and hence valued less. The same reasoning can be applied to the assumption that
is nonincreasing in j for each player i ∈ U ; that is, each player's marginal bids are nonincreasing in the level of service.
A cost-sharing mechanism collects a bid B i from each player i ∈ U , and determines an allocation S = (s 1 , s 2 , . . . , s n ) ∈ A to serve and a price q i for each player i ∈ U . We restrict our attention to mechanisms that satisfy the following standard assumptions: (1) individual rationality, meaning that for every player i ∈ U , q i = 0 if s i = 0 and
and (2) no positive transfers, meaning that prices are always nonnegative. We also make the standard assumption that players maximize quasilinear utilities; in other words, each player i ∈ U aims to maximize
Although the primary role of a cost-sharing mechanism is to select an allocation to be served, we follow recent work and provide cost-sharing mechanisms that also produce a feasible way of serving the chosen allocation. In particular, all of the mechanisms reported in this work produce a feasible solution to the underlying optimization problem for providing allocation S. The cost of this feasible solution is denoted by c M (S), and is permitted to exceed the optimal cost c(S). It is necessary to allow sub-optimal solutions in order to implement mechanisms efficiently. For example, if the underlying optimization problem is NP-hard, then computing the optimal cost c(S) for a given allocation S cannot be accomplished in polynomial time, unless P = NP.
A mechanism can satisfy different notions of truthfulness. In this work, we focus on the notion of weak group strategyproofness (Devanur et al. 2005) . A mechanism is said to be weakly group strategyproof if no coordinated false bid by a subset of players can ever strictly increase the utility of every one of its members. Thus, in a weakly group strategyproof mechanism, every defecting coalition has at least one indifferent member.
We evaluate a cost-sharing mechanism against two types of metrics: (1) revenue and (2) economic efficiency. A mechanism is said to be β-budget-balanced for some β ≥ 1 if
for every outcome of the mechanism (allocation S, prices q i for all i ∈ U , and feasible solution for the underlying optimization problem with cost c M (S)). We follow and quantify efficiency loss in cost-sharing mechanisms through the social cost objective. The social cost incurred by a mechanism with allocation S is defined as
In other words, the social cost incurred by a mechanism is the sum of the cost incurred by the mechanism and the excluded valuations. The optimal social cost over all possible allocations is
A cost-sharing mechanism is α-approximately-efficient for some α ≥ 1 if, assuming truthful bids, it always produces an outcome with social cost at most α times that of the optimal social cost.
In this work, we follow Mehta et al. (2009) and study cost-sharing mechanisms that are induced by cost-sharing methods and offer functions. A cost-sharing method is a function χ that assigns a nonnegative cost share χ(i, j, S) for every allocation S ∈ A, and every (player, service level)
We consider cost-sharing methods that, given an allocation S, produce both the cost shares χ(i, j, S) for all (i, j) ∈ S and a feasible solution to the underlying optimization problem for providing the allocation S. A cost-sharing method is β-budget-balanced for a cost function c and
where c χ (S) is the cost of the feasible solution produced by the cost-sharing method χ for allocation S.
An offer function τ specifies a nonnegative offer time τ (i, j, S) for every allocation S ∈ A, and every (player, service level) pair (i, j) ∈ S. These times specify the order in which the (player, service level) pairs of S should be offered a price, with lower times corresponding to earlier offers, and equal times indicating simultaneous offers.
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Together, a cost-sharing method and an offer function induce a mechanism that simulates an iterative auction. The mechanism M (χ, τ ) induced by cost-sharing method χ and offer function τ is given by the following.
Collect a bid
for every i ∈ U and j ∈ {1, ..., s i }, then stop. Output the allocation S, the feasible solution constructed by χ for S, and prices
4. Among all players i ∈ U and levels j ∈ {1, ..., s i } with b i (j) < χ(i, j, S), let (i * , j * ) be one with minimum τ (i, j, S). Break ties arbitrarily.
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. Set s i * = j * − 1 and return to Step 3.
Given an offer function τ , for an allocation S ∈ A and (i, j) ∈ S, define the following sets of (player, service level) pairs:
The offer function τ is valid for χ if the following three properties hold for every allocation S and
(c) offer times τ (i, j, S) are strictly increasing in j.
A cost-sharing method χ is demand-monotone if for every player i ∈ U and allocation S, χ(i, j, S)
is nondecreasing in j. The induced general demand cost-sharing mechanism M (χ, τ ) is acyclic if χ is demand-monotone and τ is valid for χ. Acyclic mechanisms have the following guarantee of truthfulness.
Theorem 2.1 (Mehta et al. (2009) ). Every general demand acyclic mechanism is weakly group strategyproof.
General demand singleton mechanisms
In this section, we extend the singleton mechanism framework for binary demand cost-sharing games by Brenner and Schäfer (2008b) to general demand cost-sharing games.
A singleton offer function is an offer function τ such that for any allocation S ∈ A,
In other words, τ induces a unique permutation of the (player, service level) pairs in any allocation S ∈ A. Note that for a singleton offer function τ , we have that E τ (i, j, S) = ∅ for any (i, j) ∈ S, and so in the definition of the validity of an offer function, condition (b) reduces to condition (a). If τ is a singleton offer function, then M (χ, τ ) is a called a (general demand) singleton mechanism.
We call a singleton offer function τ consistent if for any closed subsets P ⊆ Q ∈ A indexed such that
we have the following: if k is the minimal index of a (player, service level)
Roughly speaking, with a consistent offer function, if it orders the (player, service level) pairs in a particular order in an allocation Q, then it orders the first common (player, service level) pairs in the same order in any closed subset of allocation Q.
Let alg be a β-approximation algorithm for the underlying optimization problem, and letc(S) be the cost of the feasible solution output by alg for the underlying optimization problem for serving 8 allocation S. We say that alg is partially increasing with respect to offer function τ ifc(L τ (i, j, S)) ≥ c(L τ (i, j, S)) for all S ∈ A, i ∈ U and j ∈ {1, 2, . . . , s i }. We say that alg is marginally increasing
for all S ∈ A, i ∈ U and j ∈ {2, 3, . . . , s i }.
We define the cost-sharing method χ induced by alg and τ as
In the following, we show that if we have a consistent singleton offer function, the cost-sharing method defined in (3.1) leads to an approximately budget-balanced acyclic mechanism.
Theorem 3.1. Suppose τ is a singleton offer function and alg is a β-approximation algorithm that is partially and marginally increasing with respect to τ . Let χ be the cost-sharing method induced by alg and τ . Then:
then τ is valid for χ.
Proof. Since alg is marginally increasing with respect to the offer function τ , χ is demand-monotone, and so (a) holds.
Next, we show (b). By the definition of χ, for any allocation S ∈ A, we have
Since alg is a β-approximation algorithm, we have thatc(S) ≤ βc(S), and so χ is β-budget-balanced.
Finally, we show (c).
Since τ is consistent, we have that (i , j ) = (i , j ) for all = 1, . . . , k − 1. In addition, since
Since τ is a singleton offer function, τ (i, j, S) is increasing in j for any fixed i. Hence, τ is valid for χ.
Consider an execution of the mechanism M (χ, τ ), where τ is consistent, and therefore valid for χ. Suppose (i * , j * ) is chosen in
Step 4 of the current iteration: in other words, among the (player, service level) pairs (i, j) that satisfy b i (j) < χ(i, j, S), (i * , j * ) has the lowest offer time.
Let us examine the (player, service level) pairs that precede (i * , j * ) according to τ in the current iteration. Since each of these (player, service level) pairs (i, j) satisfies b i (j) ≥ χ(i, j, S) in the current iteration, τ being valid for χ implies that each of these (i, j) will satisfy b i (j) ≥ χ(i, j, S) in the next iteration. In addition, by the consistency of τ , these (player, service level) pairs will be the first (player, service level) pairs according to τ in the next iteration. Repeating this argument, we see that when the mechanism chooses a (player, service level) pair in Step 4, all of the (player, service level) pairs preceding it according to τ will remain at the beginning of the ordering defined by τ in future iterations, and in the end, will be served.
We call a cost-sharing method weakly monotone if (i,j)∈T χ(i, j, S) ≥c(T ) for all S ∈ A and for every subset T ⊆ S (T is not necessarily closed). Roughly speaking, for the cost-sharing method defined in (3.1), weak monotonicity implies that as the size of an allocation increases, so does the total cost share of its members. Weak monotonicity implies the following result regarding economic efficiency.
Theorem 3.2. Let M (χ, τ ) be a general demand singleton acyclic mechanism, where τ is a consistent singleton offer function, and the cost sharing method χ is induced by τ and some approximation algorithm alg, as defined in (3.1). In addition, let χ be weakly monotone. Let S M be the allocation output by the mechanism M (χ, τ ), and S * ∈ arg min S∈A {c(S)
α-approximately-efficient, where α is any value such that
Proof. We use techniques from the proof of Theorem 3 in Brenner and Schäfer (2008b) . We start by examining the ratio between the social cost of the allocation S M = (s M 1 , s M 2 , . . . , s M n ) chosen by the mechanism and the optimal social cost, achieved by S * = (s * 1 , s * 2 , . . . , s * n ):
Inequality (i) comes from the fact that for arbitrary real numbers a ≥ b ≥ c ≥ 0, we have that 
. . , D m be a partition of the (player, service level) pairs in the set S * \ S M , ordered according to when they are dropped by the mechanism (i.e.,
Step 5). In particular, let D k be the kth set of (player, service level) pairs in S * \ S M dropped by the mechanism. For k ∈ {1, 2, . . . , m}, let S k be the set of (player, service level) pairs remaining at the beginning of iteration in which D k is dropped, and let T k = S k ∩ (S M ∪ S * ). Finally, for k ∈ {1, 2, . . . , m}, let (i k , j k ) be the (player, service level) pair chosen in Step 4 of the iteration in which D k is dropped. Note that for k ∈ {1, 2, . . . , m − 1}, we have that T k = T k+1 ∪ D k . In addition, note that for k ∈ {1, 2, . . . , m}, D k consists of (player, service level) pairs (i k , j) with j ≥ j k .
Fix some k ∈ {1, 2, . . . , m}. Since (i k , j k ) is chosen in Step 4 of the iteration in which D k is dropped, we have that
Therefore, by the discussion after the proof of Theorem 3.1, we have that
Since τ is consistent and hence valid for χ, it follows that χ(i k , j k , S k ) = χ(i k , j k , T k ), and so
. Summing over all elements in
Substituting this in the numerator of (3.2), we have the desired result.
General demand scheduling cost-sharing games
In this section, we apply the framework in the previous section to establish cost-sharing mechanisms for the following general demand scheduling cost-sharing games that arise from well-studied scheduling problems.
• Single machine environment. Each player i ∈ U has a set of jobs {1, 2, . . . , R i } to be processed on a single machine. We alternately refer to player i's jth job as job (i, j). The jobs {1, 2, . . . , R i } correspond to the service levels for player i: if job (i, j) is processed, then jobs (i, 1), (i, 2), . . . , (i, j − 1) must also be processed. An allocation in this setting is a set of jobs that is processed for each player.
The processing time of job (i, j) is p i (j). The single machine can execute at most one job at a time and preemption of jobs is not allowed. Each player i ∈ U has a performance function f i that is nondecreasing and concave with f i (0) = 0. The cost c(S) for an allocation S is the minimum value of (i,j)∈S f i (C i (j)), where C i (j) is the completion time of job (i, j).
Following the standard notation for scheduling problems due to Graham et al. (1979) , we call this setting a 1 | | f i (C i ) general demand cost-sharing game.
• Identical parallel machine environment. This setting is defined in the same way for
, except now jobs are processed on one of m identical parallel machines. As in the single machine environment, any machine can execute at most one job at a time, and preemption of jobs is not allowed. Following the notation of Graham et al. (1979) , we call this
• Concurrent open shop environment. We are given a set of machines M = {1, 2, . . . , m}, with each machine capable of processing one operation type. Each player i ∈ U has a set of jobs {1, 2, . . . , R i }, with each job requiring specific amounts of processing for each of the m operation types. As in the single machine environment, we alternately refer to player i's jth job as job (i, j). The jobs {1, 2, . . . , R i } correspond to the service levels for player i: if job (i, j)
is processed, then jobs (i, 1), (i, 2), . . . , (i, j − 1) must also be processed. An allocation in this setting is a set of jobs that is processed for each player.
The processing time of job (i, j)'s operation on machine k is p ik (j). Operations are independent of each other: in particular, operations from the same job can be processed in parallel. A job is completed when all its operations are completed. As above, each player i ∈ U has a performance function f i that is nondecreasing and concave with f i (0) = 0. The cost c(S)
for an allocation S is the minimum value of i∈S f i (C i (j)), where C i (j) is the completion time of job (i, j).
Following the notation of Leung et al. (2005), we call this setting a PD
The objective function f i (C i ) in the scheduling cost-sharing games described above is sometimes referred to as a concave regular sum objective in the scheduling literature. When f i is linear for each player i ∈ U , this objective is simply the classic total weighted completion time objective.
Therefore, the underlying scheduling problems of the games described above include the classic problems of minimizing the total weighted completion time on a single machine (e.g. Smith 1956 ), on identical parallel machines (e.g. Eastman et al. 1964) Roughly speaking, a list scheduling algorithm for a scheduling problem computes a permutation of jobs, and then schedules the jobs on the machines according to this permutation. For the purposes of this work, we impose the following restrictions on how a list scheduling algorithm behaves in different machine environments.
• In a single machine environment, a list scheduling algorithm schedules the jobs according to the permutation, without idle time, on the machine.
• In an identical parallel machine environment, a list scheduling algorithm considers jobs in the permutation one-by-one, scheduling the next job without idle time on the machine with the minimum load. 2
• In a concurrent open shop environment, a list scheduling algorithm schedules the operations on each machine according to the permutation, without idle time.
These algorithms are not meant to be used with scheduling problems with release dates or deadlines (although they may be used for problems with due dates).
For the purposes of this work, in the context of general demand scheduling cost-sharing games, a list scheduling algorithm computes a permutation on the (player, service level) pairs in the allocation R max , and for any allocation S ∈ A, schedules the (player, service level) pairs in S according to this permutation. We say that a list scheduling algorithm alg is compatible for a general demand scheduling cost-sharing game if the permutation σ : {1, 2, . . . , |R max |} → R max that alg computes satisfies σ −1 (i, j) < σ −1 (i, k) for any player i ∈ U and (i, j), (i, k) ∈ R max with j < k.
In other words, with a compatible list scheduling algorithm, the ordering of a player's service levels always coincides with the algorithm's ordering of the corresponding jobs.
We say that τ is the singleton offer function induced by a list scheduling algorithm alg if for every allocation S and (i, j), (k, ) ∈ S,
where σ : {1, 2, . . . , |R max |} → R max is the permutation computed by alg. In other words, τ orders the jobs in every allocation according to the permutation computed by alg. Note that a singleton 2 The load of a machine is equal to the sum of the processing times of all the jobs scheduled on that machine.
14 offer function induced by alg is consistent.
To illustrate the various assumptions on valuations and bids in the context of general demand scheduling cost-sharing games, as well as the notion of compatibility, consider the following example.
Suppose that each player's service levels are sequenced according to nonincreasing importance: each player's first service levels correspond to its most critical jobs, and the ones that follow correspond to optional, or less important jobs. Furthermore, suppose that each player's service levels are ordered according to nondecreasing processing times. This makes sense in settings in which all tasks are identical, or in which initial jobs can be performed quickly, but later jobs take a long time. For example, an intricate product may have basic components that can be produced quickly by machine, but due to its delicate nature, the product in its final stages must be assembled by hand.
In the context of general demand scheduling cost-sharing games, we can interpret v i (j) as the marginal value that player i derives when job (i, j) is processed after jobs (i, 1), . . . , (i, j − 1) have already been processed, and b i (j) as the marginal bid that player i offers to have job (i, j) processed after jobs (i, 1), . . . , (i, j − 1) have already been processed. Recall that we assume that the marginal valuations v i (j) are nonincreasing in the service level j: that is, as a player receives more and more service, the less additional value that player derives. This is a reasonable assumption in the setting described above, since each players' jobs are sequenced in order of nonincreasing importance.
Likewise, in this setting, assuming that the marginal bids b i (j) are nonincreasing in the service level j is also reasonable. Finally, note that in the setting described above, any list scheduling algorithm that sequences jobs in order of nondecreasing processing times is compatible.
Single machine environment (
Before we proceed, we need the following two lemmas.
Lemma 4.1. Suppose alg is a compatible list scheduling algorithm for a 1 | | f i (C i ) general demand cost-sharing game. Let τ be a singleton offer function induced by alg, and let χ be the cost-sharing method induced by alg and τ . Then (a) alg is partially increasing with respect to τ ; (b) alg is marginally increasing with respect to τ ; and (c) χ is weakly monotone.
Proof. For any set of jobs S, let C S k ( ) be the completion time of job (k, ) in a schedule computed by alg, and letc(S) be the cost of the schedule output by alg.
First, we show (a). For any S ∈ A and (i, j) ∈ S, we havē
Since f i is a nondecreasing function with
Next, we show (b). Since alg is compatible, we know that (i, j) is scheduled after (i, j − 1).
This implies that C
Hence alg is marginally increasing.
Finally, we show (c). By definition, for every allocation S ∈ A and (i, j) ∈ S, χ(i, j, S) = Proof. To show this result, we employ a technique from the proof of Lemma 2 in Brenner and Schäfer (2008b) . Suppose we have two disjoint sets of jobs, A and B. Consider an optimal schedule for jobs in A, and let C A i (j) be the completion time of (i, j) ∈ A in this optimal schedule. Define
Now consider the schedule for jobs in A ∪ B obtained by ordering the jobs in the nondecreasing order of the completion times {C A i (j) : (i, j) ∈ A} and {C B i (j) : (i, j) ∈ B}. This new schedule is feasible for A ∪ B. Consider the completion time of (i, j) ∈ A in this new schedule. Let (i * , j * ) be the last job in B that was scheduled before (i, j) in the new schedule. Therefore, the completion time of (i, j) in this new schedule is
Reversing the roles of A and B, we obtain a similar result for (i, j) ∈ B. Since f i is concave and nondecreasing with f i (0) = 0, we have
With Lemmas 4.1 and 4.2 in hand, we can show the following result. Proof. By Theorem 3.1 and Lemma 4.1(a)-(b), we have that M (χ, τ ) is β-budget-balanced. For any set of jobs S, let c(S) be the cost of an optimal schedule, and letc(S) be the cost of the schedule output by alg. Let S M be the allocation output by M (χ, τ ), and let S * be an allocation that achieves the optimal social cost. Note that by Lemma 4.2,
Therefore, by Lemma 4.1(c) and Theorem 3.2, we have that M (χ, τ ) is 2β-approximately-efficient.
Although it is straightforward to construct a compatible list scheduling algorithm, it is not necessarily easy to construct one that produces optimal or near-optimal schedules. For example, fix some permutation (i 1 , . . . , i n ) of U . Then, a list scheduling algorithm that sequences the jobs in any allocation S ∈ A according to the permutation
is always compatible. However, it is straightforward to show that there exists an instance for which the list scheduling algorithm above is a β-approximation algorithm for 1 | | w i C i with β arbitrarily large.
On the other hand, for 1 | | w i C i general demand cost-sharing games, when each player's service levels are ordered according to nondecreasing processing times, we can use Smith's rule as a compatible list scheduling algorithm. Smith's rule is an optimal list scheduling algorithm for the scheduling problem 1 | | w i C i ; that is, it is a 1-approximation algorithm (Smith 1956 ). It schedules the jobs in order of nonincreasing weight-to-processing-time ratio. Theorem 4.3 implies the following corollary.
Corollary 4.4. Suppose Smith's rule is a compatible list scheduling algorithm for a 1 | | w i C i general demand cost-sharing game; that is, for any player i ∈ U , we have that
Let τ be a singleton offer function induced by Smith's rule, and let χ be the cost-sharing method induced by alg and τ . Then M (χ, τ ) is 1-budget-balanced and 2-approximately efficient.
Note that this corollary includes the case in which all jobs for a given player have identical processing times.
Identical parallel machine environment (P
Before we can show the main result of this subsection, we need the following two lemmas.
Lemma 4.5. Suppose alg is a compatible list scheduling algorithm for a P | | f i (C i ) general demand cost-sharing game. Let τ be a singleton offer function induced by alg, and let χ be the cost-sharing method induced by alg and τ . Then (a) alg is partially increasing with respect to τ ;
for every player i ∈ U , then alg is marginally increasing with respect to τ ; and (c) χ is weakly monotone.
Proof. The proofs of (a) and (c) are identical to those of Lemmas 4.1(a) and (c), respectively.
We show (b). Since alg is a compatible algorithm, (i, j) is scheduled after (i, j − 1). Therefore, during the course of alg, (i, j) is scheduled on a machine with an equal or greater load than the machine on which (i, j − 1) was scheduled. By assumption, p i (j) ≥ p i (j − 1). Therefore,
. Therefore, alg is marginally increasing. Proof. We use a technique from the proof of Lemma 2 in Brenner and Schäfer (2008b) . Consider two disjoint sets of jobs A and B. Fix a machinem. Consider an optimal schedule for the jobs in A, and letÂ be the set of jobs scheduled on machinem. Let the completion time of (i, j) ∈Â in this optimal schedule be C A i (j). DefineB and C B i (j) for (i, j) ∈B similarly. Now consider the schedule for jobs inÂ ∪B, restricted to machinem, obtained by ordering the jobs in nondecreasing order of the completion times {C A i (j) : (i, j) ∈Â} and {C B i (j) : (i, j) ∈B}.
Using a similar argument to the one used in the proof of Lemma 4.2, we can show that in this new schedule, the completion time of each job (i, j) ∈Â is at most 2C A i (j), and the completion time of each job (i, j) ∈B is at most 2C B i (j). By summing over all the machines, we obtain the desired result.
Now, we can show the following result.
Theorem 4.7. Suppose alg is a compatible list scheduling β-approximation algorithm for a Corollary 4.8. Suppose WSPT is a compatible list scheduling algorithm for a P | | w i C i general demand cost-sharing game; that is, for any player i ∈ U , we have that
Let τ be a singleton offer function induced by WSPT, and let χ be the cost-sharing method induced by alg and τ . Then M (χ, τ ) is ((1 + √ 2)/2)-budget-balanced and (1 + √ 2)-approximately-efficient.
Concurrent open shop environment (PD
Before moving on, we need the following two lemmas.
Lemma 4.9. Suppose alg is a compatible list scheduling algorithm for a PD | | f i (C i ) general demand cost-sharing game. Let τ be a singleton offer function induced by alg, and let χ be the cost-sharing method induced by alg and τ . Then (a) alg is partially increasing with respect to τ ; (b) alg is marginally increasing with respect to τ ; and (c) χ is weakly monotone.
Proof. The proof is similar to that of Lemma 4.1. Proof. We employ a technique from the proof of Lemma 2 in Brenner and Schäfer (2008b) . Consider two disjoint sets of jobs A and B. Consider an optimal schedule for the jobs in A, and let the completion time of operation k ∈ {1, 2, . . . , m} of job (i, j) ∈ A in this optimal schedule be C A ki (j).
The completion time of job (i, j) in this optimal schedule is C A i (j) = max k=1,2,...,m {C A ki (j)}. Define C B ki (j) and C B i (j) for k ∈ {1, 2, . . . , m} and (i, j) ∈ B similarly. Now consider the schedule for jobs in A ∪ B obtained by ordering the jobs in the nondecreasing order of the completion times {C A i (j) : (i, j) ∈ A} and {C B i (j) : (i, j) ∈ B}. This new schedule is feasible for A ∪ B. Note that the jobs are scheduled in the same order on each machine. By a similar argument to one used in the proof of Lemma 4.2, we can show that the completion time of each operation k ∈ {1, 2, . . . , m} of job (i, j) ∈ A in this new schedule is at most 2C A ki (j).
Therefore, the completion time of job (i, j) ∈ A in this new schedule is at most 2C A k * i (j) for some operation k * ∈ {1, 2, . . . , m}, which is at most 2C A i (j). A similar argument can be made for jobs in B. With this in hand, again, by a similar argument to one used in the proof of Lemma 4.2, we obtain the desired result.
With these lemmas, we can now show the following result.
Theorem 4.11. Suppose alg is a compatible list scheduling β-approximation algorithm for a PD | | f i (C i ) general demand cost-sharing game. Let τ be a singleton offer function induced by alg, and let χ be the cost-sharing method induced by alg and τ . Then M (χ, τ ) is β-budget-balanced and 2β-approximately-efficient.
Proof. Using Theorem 3.1 and Lemma 4.9(a)-(b), we have that M (χ, τ ) is β-budget-balanced. From Lemmas 4.9(c) and 4.10 and Theorem 3.2, we have that M is 2β-approximately-efficient.
As before, it is easy to construct a compatible list scheduling algorithm, but it is not necessarily easy to construct one that produces optimal or near-optimal schedules. For PD | | Corollary 4.12. Suppose WSMP is a compatible list scheduling algorithm for a PD | | w i C i general demand cost-sharing game with m operation types; that is, for any player i ∈ U , we have that max k {p ki (1)} ≤ max k {p ki (2)} ≤ · · · ≤ max k {p ki (R i )}. Let τ be a singleton offer function induced by WSMP, and let χ be the cost-sharing method induced by alg and τ . Then M (χ, τ ) is m-budget-balanced and 2m-approximately efficient.
Conclusion
In this work, we studied cost-sharing mechanisms for general demand cost-sharing games. In particular, we extended the singleton mechanism framework of Brenner and Schäfer (2008b) for binary demand cost-sharing games to general demand cost-sharing games, by showing how to use an approximation algorithm for the underlying optimization problem of a cost-sharing game to design an acyclic mechanism that is approximately budget-balanced and approximately efficient. We applied this framework to general demand scheduling cost-sharing games in single machine, identical parallel machine, and concurrent open shop environments with concave regular sum objectives.
In particular, with a compatible list scheduling β-approximation algorithm, this framework yields β-budget-balanced and 2β-approximately-efficient cost-sharing mechanisms for all these general demand scheduling cost-sharing games.
One drawback of the cost-sharing mechanisms presented in this work for scheduling cost-sharing games is that their budget-balance and efficiency performance guarantees depend on the players' service level structure. In particular, we require that the list scheduling approximation algorithms used be compatible with the players' service levels. It would be interesting to investigate the design of cost-sharing mechanisms for general demand cost-sharing scheduling games that relax this dependency, while maintaining good budget-balance and efficiency properties.
